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20 articles from Crelis on GREENLIGHT. Most recent: “How Long Should Audit Logs Be Kept? How the Number Is Actually Chosen”.
Retention should start with the evidence the organisation may need to produce, not with a platform default.
Attestation can prove that specified requirements were demonstrated, but it does not prove that a specific AI-agent action was authorised at runtime.
Cross-border agent record retention should start with named instruments and authority records, not country labels or platform log defaults.
Non-repudiation is evidence for a later denial, not proof that the action was right.
Agent security maps help only if they lead to evidence for the permission behind a consequential action.
OWASP gives teams a dated field reference for agentic AI risk, not proof that a live action was authorised.
Transparency can explain that AI was involved. It does not prove that an agent had authority to release money, delete a record, or change a credit limit.
NIST's agent standards work matters, but it does not prove that a payment release, deleted record, or changed credit limit was authorised.
MCP authorization uses OAuth to govern access to a server, but it does not prove why a payment release or record deletion was allowed.
MAS’s AI risk management material increases pressure to evidence authorization at the point an agent acts.
MCP Multi Round-Trip Requests make approval easier to place in the request path, but they do not preserve the evidence behind an authority decision.
An LLM judge can return a different verdict on the same facts tomorrow; a deterministic policy engine returns the same decision each time and can name the rule that made it — that difference decides w
Identity tells you who an AI agent is. Authorization tells you it was allowed to act. Evidence tells you that you can still prove both later, to someone who does not trust your dashboard, and that thi
Blocking a bad action proves nothing about the good ones you allowed. Enforcement stops an action; evidence proves, afterwards, that an action was authorized and by whom — and almost no one sells the
MCP can authorize an individual tool call and can pause mid-call for a human decision; what it cannot do is record which policy permitted the action, or keep that record after the call returns.
Entry-tier tracing plans keep traces for days or weeks, while a Singapore capital markets services licence holder must keep the books the Securities and Futures Act requires for not less than five yea
An autonomous agent's mandate is only as strong as the infrastructure that constrains it. Accountability for unauthorized actions is a matter of architectural integrity, not better model training.
Security decides what an AI agent is able to do; governance decides who is answerable for what it did — and only one of them leaves you evidence.
We have filed our first patent application covering the GREENLIGHT decision runtime.
A short film on the question every enterprise will have to answer — who, actually, authorized the AI?